

Does The Islamic Republic demise derive from its presidential election?

Kambiz Basetvat-Thursday, January 29, 2009

In 1979, in the final months of Shah's regime, Khomeinist forces in their scheme to take over political power in Iran stressed on the republicanism of their Islamic regime to cement support of nationalists, liberals, and leftists for their leadership of an anti Shah movement. The Islamist later proved the worthlessness of their promise to none religious political groups, but the regime was trapped with idea of the power and legitimacy of the people's votes and republicanism of the regime. In the three decades of Islamic regime existence the political landscape in Iran has changed dramatically, yet the Islamic regime founding cadre's firm hold on the political power survived the internal and external challenges. With the Islamo-fascist firmly in control, the two elected political bodies, Presidential and Majles, became the thermometer of Iran's political being. Islamist's intelligence and creatively constructed several Islamic institutions, such as the *vlaiaat faghih* (supreme leader), *shoraya nekahban* (the council of guardian, chosen by *valit faghih*), *majles khabregan* (council of experts), *majma tashkhise maslehate nezam* (collective determination of regime's expedience), to safeguard the tyranny of Islamist and the political uselessness of popular vote.

Republicanism of the Islamic regime evolved into a useful tool for the opposing political forces consisting of Islamist factions and secularists. Although the capable dictators of Khomeini's inner circle kept their stronghold on the political power, but they were adhered to elections to legitimize Islamic regime; while they shamelessly used their self-appreciated Islamic institutions and even outright cheating in the voting poles to install their chosen and under control collaborators to the elected bodies. In the last presidential and Majles elections' competitions, Islamo-fascist leadership in the highest level after limiting voters choices demonstrated their electoral cheating. What traditionally used to be individual Mullah's popular support and consequently his importance by the quantity of people attending his sermons in the Masjed now become the electoral votes. For Islamic regime leaders and supporters popular vote of election carries the legitimacy of their regime, but the democratic oppositions' adherent target the elections to deny the regime popular legitimacy by over coming elections road blocks, limitations and as the last choice sanctions.

Today's national political mentality compared to pre-Islamic revolution has transformed drastically. The leftist ideological dominance formulated in anti-imperialism and private enterprise, legitimized by the Shah autocracy which had been permeated among highly educated urbanity, have been replaced by a new generation of the educated intelligentsia; they support democracy and the legitimacy of people's rights for change because they are in agony of Islamic regime's general population social terror in addition to political dictatorship and external Islamic adventurism. The secularly educated but politically religiously oriented had provided Khomeini's mullahs and their uneducated supporters' political prestige in competition with leftist; they also, albeit for different reasons, generally shared with leftist the anti-imperialism and west dogma. But they were disillusioned by the mullah's primitive Islam. After the revolution the conflict between Islamo-fascist and religiously oriented democrats became Iran's politics reality. The Islamo-democrats, having lost all of powerful political institutions to Khomeinist, hanged to the republicanism of regime with the aim to take over the presidency office and Majles majority. That was when president Khatemi with an overwhelming vote of people won the presidency.

President Khatemi didn't advance democracy in his eight years of presidency. Furthermore, when he faced with frontal attacks of Khomeinist, Khatemi retreated; and his surrendering policy left reformist and democrats at the mercy of Islamo-fascist, who used their opportunity wildly. Khatemi's

lack of courage and appetite in confronting Khomeinist facilitated Ahmadinejad's election to presidency. Ahmadinejad owes his victory to low voter turnout, unattractive choices, democrats' sanctions, and outright ballot stuffing.

The next presidential election will be held on June of 2009. There is a great deal of preparation among the regime's democrat and reformist oppositions. The students' movement and their supporters after having shaken of their communist agenda became hard-line defenders of democracy and human rights representatives. The reformists firmly believe Khatemi's weak performance encouraged Islamofascist to take over institutions of political power all over the country. According to reformists' analysis the presidential election will offer the chance to mobilize a decisive force of social movement; they believe the forces of social movement were at hand when Khatemi was elected almost twelve years ago, but he lost the opportunity to advance and establish democracy on the firm ground. The great debate among reformist is that who can lead the incoming social movement which must be generated for the upcoming presidential election. The reformers presidential candidate choices and for support comes down to three mullahs: One is the former Majles speaker and boss of "party of national trust" or "*Hezb Etamad Meli*" which he funded. It was believed, generally, his victory was stolen by Ahmadinejad in last presidential election. He seems to be an affable man who thinks reforms can go very far with skillful negotiations with the hard liners that made life so hard for so many Iranians including Islamist reformers who support the Islamic regime.

Former president Khatemi has shown interest for the job that he failed to perform accordingly when he had the opportunity. Also, he is demonstrating a great deal of hesitation and is reluctant to declare his candidacy outright. It seems other than his supporting party "*Hezb Mosharect Eslami*" or Party of Islamic Participation, which is being run by his brother, he is looking for any sign of support among regimes authorities. Furthermore Khatemi seeks the student organizations support which matters the most among critics of the regime. His third term presidency ambition might end up where the other pillar of Islamic Republic regime, Rafsanjani, third term came down, with a sound defeat from Ahmadinejad.

The candidate chosen by student organizations and former members of student organizations, which seems very hard for them to depart from out of fear of losing legitimacy for being the true opposition of regime, is the former interior minister of Khatemi administration. He became the focal point of Islamofascist wrath and end up in jail for several years because Khatemi did not defend his loyal minister. The student prestigious political adherents argue that to achieve democracy and human rights in Iran they need to upset balance of political power, which will be achieved through national social movement. They believe the candidate for presidency eventually must lead the social movement; this leader must have certain qualifications such as: not being part of dictatorial regime, having the courage and integrity to stand up against Islamofascist, and being able to take the maximum advantage of social movement. The students conclude that former interior minister and prisoner of the regime a life-long Mullah Abdollah Nori fits their historical needs. The far right reformist, who intend to beg political reforms from Islamofascist, argue that students opposition choose Nori because they know The Council of Guardians will not permit Nori to run for presidential election; consequently, they can reasonably sanction the election. In contrast the students argue that the popularity of Nori's choice will create such a popular support that will not allow his disqualification and margin of his vote will be so huge that vote fraud could not change the result. In short, Nori's candidacy by reformers will situate the regime in a losing position either way: if Nori candidacy permitted he will win with a massive voters turnout if not voters turnout will be so low that election loses its legitimacy and social movement will seek alternative political direction.

As the up-coming June election approaches and student organizations plans for the election development, absence of the main character and chosen leader of social movement becomes more annoying. Abdollah Nori hasn't declared his candidacy for the presidency, but has declared his intention and candidacy's exploration. His hesitation and reluctance raised considerable concern among his supporters. The student commentators speculate that maybe he is not up to task of taking the torch of change for democracy, civil society, and the human rights and challenging his old revolutionary friends. The man who probably is standing on the cross road of his nation's history revealed in a customary sarcastic way of politics in mullahcrazy his state of mind. Nori, in a questions and answers with students, has alluded to Senator Barack Obama's election to the United State presidency office and reminded Islamic Republic leaders that in good deeds they should not fall behind. By saying that he implied the guardians of Islamic regime should give the opposition like him a fair chance as did the United State of America.

We don't have to wait for too long to see how the coming election will effect Iran political future. Will a Mullah save the Iranian nation from mullahs and from disasters threatening the country on the horizon? Contemporary Iranian history during the shining years of the constitutional revolution produced great progressive Mullahs who adhered firmly to democracy and people's power. Perhaps we are at the positive cycle of Iranian history

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